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TAGS: [ENRG](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [AORC](#) [IR](#) [RS](#) [FR](#) [CH](#)
SUBJECT: TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR: PRC AMBASSADOR SAYS
SUPPORTIVE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi told Ambassador October 16 that China had expressed to Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Baqeri its hope that the proposed IAEA deal to transfer Iranian LEU for further enrichment abroad and fabricate fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) would succeed. Briefed by UNVIE Ambassador on the intent of meetings scheduled for October 19-20 at the IAEA, the Chinese Ambassador saw the matter as both a test of Iran's peaceful nuclear intent and as an Iranian test of U.S. credibility. He personally hoped a successful transaction would provide a "good example" for cooperation with Iran in peaceful nuclear operations. In a curious apparent garble, Hu reported having heard from France's IAEA Ambassador that nuclear material would not be transported to France for TRR fuel fabrication; rather, France would provide technical support for fabrication in Russia. Ambassador Davies indicated doubt that this would be the arrangement. End Summary.

¶2. (S) Ambassador invited China's Ambassador to the IAEA Hu Xiaodi the morning of October 16 in order to acquaint Hu with the aims and organization of upcoming meetings under IAEA auspices treating the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Ambassador emphasized that the discrete objective of producing a new fuel load for the safeguarded reactor, permitting the continued production of medical isotopes, was and would be an IAEA-led "deal." Ambassador sketched the steps -- transfer of 1200 kg of LEU from Iran to Russia; further enrichment to 19.75 percent U235; transport to France for fabrication; re-importation into Iran and installation of fuel rods under IAEA safeguards -- all at Iranian expense. To Hu's question as to the U.S. role justifying participation in the meetings (when other P5 1 are not involved), Ambassador said it was due to Iranian insistence, presumably as a political signal of support for the deal but also possibly as an opportunity to raise technical issues of refurbishing the control room of the U.S.-built TRR.

¶3. (S) Hu reported having understood (Comment: Likely misunderstood. End comment.) from France's IAEA Ambassador Mangin that nuclear material would not be transported to France for TRR fuel fabrication. Rather, France would provide technical support for fabrication in Russia; Hu speculated that France would supply casks or other equipment. Ambassador Davies said he had not heard any such suggestion from France or other participants.

¶4. (S) Ambassador went on to identify for Hu the likely heads

of delegation from the U.S., Russia, and France and noted that Iran had been difficult over the preceding two days in discussions with the IAEA Secretariat. While messages had been inconsistent, the Ambassador said, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Salehi was reportedly under instruction not to travel to Vienna, which some on the Iranian side had tried to justify out of pique over Secretary Clinton's remarks of days before in London about the Iranian domestic scene. In the U.S. view, the IAEA talks were about a discrete technical and commercial issue and should include Salehi; in his absence it would be unclear that an Iranian delegation would be empowered to conclude arrangements for this deal, to which Iran had already agreed in principle in Geneva October 1. We understood the IAEA and the Russian Government were advising Tehran to send a duly empowered delegation; while he would make no official request of China, the Ambassador said, he asked that Hu consider in what manner China could encourage Iran toward a successful outcome. Hu at first replied it would be "odd" for China to request that Iran send a specific official to a meeting China itself has no part in; (the Ambassador countered that China could express a view as a member of the P5 1). Later, however, Hu volunteered that his government had told "Jalili's deputy (Iranian DFM Ali) Baqeri" that China hoped the deal would be concluded.

15. (S) Ambassador closed by reaffirming the U.S. interest in achieving success on TRR. However, should Iran backtrack, he said, that would inevitably impact on our approach to Iran's safeguards issues and the Qom inspection. Hu mentioned having heard of European interest in convening the P5 1 Poldirs at an early date; his personal view was that the end

of October would be too soon after the Qom inspection. Ambassador Davies offered no firm position on when the Poldirs should meet but speculated that under Iranian constraints a first inspection visit to Qom would likely provide more questions than answers, necessitating the inspectors' early return to the site.

16. (U) Ambassador Hu was accompanied by Chinese Msnoff Ms. Qean Wang, whom Hu identified as his action officer for CTBT matters.

DAVIES